A lot of the work you do as a lawyer involves reading past cases
to find out what decisions were made in cases similar to the one you're working
on.
The following is an example of a judge's decision in a case in
which the plaintiffs (the person who initiates the legal action) wanted a
bylaw removed. The bylaw made it legal for the pound to destroy "dangerous
dogs" during an alleged time of emergency.
Judgments can be difficult
to read, but at least in this case the judge had a sense of humor. Most decisions
aren't so entertaining.
Your job is to understand the details of this
case, so that you can use the information in a similar case you're working
on now.
Read the judgment, and summarize in your own words the key
points in the case. Use good grammar and write as quickly and accurately as
possible.
You'll have to grasp the argument and jargon that the judge
uses. Be prepared to do a lot of reading. Keep in mind, this is a big part
of what lawyers have to do every day.
Kuypers vs. Langley
Jan.
6, 1992. HOGARTH J. -- In the early evening hours of April 10, 1991, one of
the good citizens of the defendant, the township of Langley, was lawfully
ambling along 204th St. in the balmy spring weather, when, with little warning
or prior indication, a dog since described and defined by bylaw and otherwise
as a "dangerous dog" (a matter which is in some dispute) crossed over from
the hither side of the street and nipped the right gluteus maximus of this
innocent pedestrian.
The unfortunate and unhappy event caused a breaking
of the skin and bruising, which no matter where, how or to whomsoever such
might obtain is a traumatic and painful occurrence worthy of litigious consideration
and appropriate recompense. And let it be made abundantly clear the determination
of the villain who perpetrated this anguish has not been determined, such
matters having been left to another day and forum, as ours is of different
concern.
Alarmed and appropriately disturbed, the victim quite properly
complained to the authorities who, in the persons of the defendants Nelson
and Green, armed with all the legislative majesty and executive power granted
to them by the township of Langley "Dog Licensing and Large Animal Control
and Impounding Bylaw, 1988 No.25776" and amendments thereto, attended the
residence of the plaintiffs and after some "discussion," which apparently
became a bit of a dogfight in itself resulting in the attendance of the police,
"Robbie," the treasured Kuypers family dog, was forcibly and unceremoniously
seized from his home over the loud protestations of those present, including
the plaintiff Darrin Kuypers, who on his mute pet's behalf protested his innocence.
Such
protestations were met at least in part with the announcements of the defendants
Nelson and Green, or one of them, which remain remarkably undenied, that they
had the power under the above edict not only to seize Robbie but without any
judicial process or intervention, quasi or otherwise, to execute him on the
spot.
No line-up, no photo or otherwise for Robbie, no charge, no dramatic
readings of the canine Charter of Rights and Freedoms, no plea, no trial,
no application of the ancient and historic presumption of innocence, nor appeal
to the majesty of the Court of Appeal: guilt or innocence undetermined, Robbie
faced the ignominy of almost immediate oblivion.
Thus, Robbie was taken
to the Langley pound which, in the eyes of some, at least Robbie, is a far
cry from the warmth, solicitude and understanding of home and hearth and which
to him was indeed the equivalent of a canine Gulag.
The plaintiffs,
outraged by this effrontery to Robbie's character, insisted that not only
shall every dog have his day, but this dog shall have his day in court and
such is reinforced by the evidence of the plaintiff, Diane Kuypers, who says
on her oath that regardless of whatever evidence the defendants were relying
on to prove their case (which in truth appears to be nought but hearsay),
Robbie at all times material to the fateful incident, was in the basement
of the Kuypers' home conducting himself with the essence of canine decorum,
sober as a judge, if I dare to use the phrase, and further was never known,
nor by any stretch of the imagination could be known, as a "dangerous dog"
as defined in the said enactment or otherwise.
And thus this litigation
was commenced and, by the timely intervention of my colleague Rowan J., his
demise was thwarted by an interlocutory injunction, staying execution and
granting bail under the condition that he behave, an admonition I am certain
in Robbie's mind was totally unnecessary -- however, he did not appeal.
This
judicial stay of execution has been followed by the usual flurry of litigious
confetti that weds lawyers, Xerox and pulp producers to litigation and has
brought on this application to have declared that the bylaw purporting to
endow the defendants with such awesome authority was not as much within the
powers of the municipal council at the time it was passed as the council presumptuously
believed and, what is more, in doing what they did, the defendants infringed
the rights of the plaintiffs, whereby Robbie's dignified aplomb is assured
through the right of the plaintiff to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure of their property.
In answer, the defendant township claims
that when in 1988 the legislative solons of the defendant acted and enacted,
they did so from pure necessity under the "emergency" provisions of the Municipal
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 290, and amending Acts which they say literally, at
least in part, were designed to keep the municipality from going to the dogs,
when all other powers were wanting.
The defendants further claim that
no court of competent jurisdiction, divine or otherwise, has any right or
title to inquire into whether any such "emergency" did or did not exist; it
is sufficient that the council, in open meeting assembled, declared that it
did.
The seemingly draconian statutory instrument that brought Robbie
to the brink of disaster is concerned with numerous and sundry provisions
dealing quite properly with the licensing and control of Robbie and his friends,
but Robbie's alleged offence has brought him within the definition of a "dangerous
dog," which defines him as one that has "bitten a person without provocation"
(which I might say includes puppies of any ilk) and also describes others
with much more unpleasant characteristics.
Although referring to such
"dangerous dogs" from time to time throughout its provisions, the threat of
anonymous doom is contained in a final part (Pt. IV), which is said to be
the justification and excuse for the apprehension, detention and execution
without trial of poor Robbie. It reads as follows:
PART
VI - DANGEROUS DOGS
38. It is hereby declared that a state of emergency
exists in the Township of Langley with regard to the frequency and severity
of unprovoked attacks on other animals and persons by dangerous dogs.
39.
Where the Poundkeeper is satisfied that a dangerous dog is being kept or harbored
on any premises contrary to the provisions of this Bylaw, the Poundkeeper
may enter on such premises and seize any such dangerous dog and may impound
same for a period of 10 days. If the dangerous dog is known to have inflicted
a bite on another animal or a person, it shall be kept in isolation and if
it is determined that the dangerous dog is suffering from rabies or any other
incurable sickness, the Poundkeeper may immediately destroy such dangerous
dog.
42. Where a dangerous dog which has been impounded pursuant to
Section 39 hereof and reclaimed by the owner is subsequently found to be at
large or not under control as required by this Bylaw, the Poundkeeper or any
Peace Officer may enter on any premises and seize such dangerous dogs and
may cause such dangerous dog to be destroyed.
The first
step is to inquire into the question as to whether there was an emergency
and then decide if a municipal council can declare, regardless of what any
sane view might be of the problem, an "emergency" does exist so that their
actions, otherwise somewhat shy on authority and circumstances, can become
law without any inquiry as to their justification.
In my view, the
key to the answer to these problems lies at the start, in the definition of
an "emergency." An emergency, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
is: "the sudden (or unexpected occurrence) of a state of things."
And
whereas the council has received an alarming number of complaints and reports
of unprovoked attacks on other animals and persons by dangerous dogs, which
sentiments are repeated and declared in s.38 (which I have already set out).
In
addition, Ron Edwards, the municipal clerk, has attested that "prior to the
adoption of the new bylaw, Langley had received an alarming number of complaints
and reports of unprovoked attacks on other dogs and persons by dangerous dogs."
But I note that none of these attacks have been itemized or particularized
in any way and he does not suggest that these matters arose suddenly or without
expectation. Indeed, the allegation is so vague that counsel did not seriously
rely on it in argument.
In my view, there was in fact no situation
that could be said to be an emergency and the provisions of the Municipal
Act were used to superficially justify the use of powers not otherwise granted
to the municipality.
In my view, any bylaw drafted to meet an emergency
must be designed to deal with a specific situation, existent or immediately
expected, and thus must be limited in time and cannot become a bylaw of perennial
general application to future events.
The bylaw in the case at bar,
insofar as it purports to have been passed under the emergency provisions
of the Municipal Act, cannot stand.
Accordingly, I have come to the
conclusion that the relief should be confined to a declaration that all sections
referring to "dangerous dogs" shall be declared invalid insofar as they pertain
to them, and Pt. VI is declared invalid in its entirety.
The plaintiffs
will have their costs. As for Robbie, I trust he will apply to my judgment
the immortal words of Christopher Morley, that "no one appreciates the very
special genius of your conversation as a dog does," and he might well bear
in mind that the common law only allows a dog one bite before he can be condemned.
Order
accordingly.